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Jonathan Schaﬀer (2010) has recently put on the map a new kind of sceptical scen-
ario: a scenario in which Descartes’ (1984 [1641]) all-powerful daemon ensures that
one’s belief is held on a bad basis, or even no basis at all, even though it seems to one
just like it is held on a good basis. Call this the debasing scenario. We can contrast
it with the more familiar deception scenario, in which the daemon ensures that one’s
belief is false even though it seems to one just like it is true. Schaﬀer argues that the
possibility of the debasing scenario makes available a new and interesting kind of scep-
ticism: Debasing Scepticism, which we can contrast with the more familiar Deception
Scepticism made available by the possibility of the deception scenario.
A number of commentators have responded to Shaﬀer’s article by suggesting that
he has not succeeded in putting on the map a viable new form of scepticism. Bondy and
Carter (Forthcoming) argue that the debasing scenario is not so much as metaphysically
possible in the first place. Brueckner (2011), Ballantyne and Evans (2013), and Conee
(2015), by contrast, do not doubt the possibility of the debasing scenario. Rather, each
construes in a diﬀerent way how the argument will have to move from the mere possib-
ility of the debasing scenario to the impossibility of knowledge, and raises a seemingly
devastating objection to the thought that this move is viable, construed in the relevant
way. The consensus amongst Schaﬀer’s commentators thus seems to be that Debasing
Scepticism is an interesting idea, but doesn’t really add up to an interestingly plausible
kind of Scepticism.
This paper aims to demonstrate that Debasing Scepticism is is an interestingly plaus-
ible kind of Scepticism: Schaﬀer’s critics are wrong to dismiss the argument as readily
as they do. §1 introduces Debasing Scepticism in more detail. §2 purports to under-
mine Bondy and Carter’s argument for the impossibility of the debasing scenario. §3
aims to put on the map a new way of construing the move from the possibility of the de-
basing scenario to the sceptic’s conclusion. Finally, §4 argues that, given this new way
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of construing this latter move, Schaﬀer’s remaining critics do not succeed in refuting
Debasing Scepticism.
1 Debasing Scepticism
We take ourselves to have a rich set of perceptual experiences – seeings, hearings, touch-
ings – which gives rise to a correspondingly rich body of knowledge of the sensed en-
vironment. Together with the knowledge we take ourselves to have from other sources
– testimony, introspection, memory, inference. . . – this constitutes an even richer body
of knowledge about the external world.
The sceptic denies that it is possible for us to have knowledge, at least of a certain
range of propositions, if not all. One way of arguing for scepticism is by appeal to the
possibility of sceptical scenarios: scenarios in which our perceptual-cognitive situation
is defective in some salient manner, but where we cannot distinguish our defective situ-
ation from one in which things have gone well.
Any sceptical argument which appeals to the possibility of a sceptical scenario con-
tains two steps. First, there is the establishment of the metaphysical possibility of the
relevant scenario. Second, there is the move from the possibility of that scenario to
the impossibility (and hence non-actuality) of knowledge, either of a certain range of
propositions, or of all.
The Deception Sceptic’s position is a case in point. Their first step is the estab-
lishment of the possibility of Descartes’ deception scenario.1 In that scenario an all-
powerful daemon arranges things to make it seem to one as if one is having a rich set
perceptual experiences, so that one ends up with a correspondingly rich body of em-
pirical beliefs, but those experiences are in fact systematically non-veridical, and the
corresponding body of beliefs false. It is typically taken for granted that this scenario is
metaphysically possible, thus granting the first step of the Deception Sceptic’s argument.
The second step of the Deception Sceptic’s argument is in my view best conceived as
appealing to the following principles (or some suitably reformulated versions thereof):
UnderdeterminationK Necessarily, if S knows that p then S possesses evidence {E1–
En} so that, for any not-p scenario, {E1–En} decisively favours S believing that p
over believing that they are in that scenario.
Phenomenal EvidenceP (i) Necessarily, for any proposition known by S via percep-
tion, p, S knows that p only because S believes that p on the basis of evidence
1Or else some equivalent, such as the brain-in-a-vat scenario.
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supplied to them by their sensory experience; and (ii) Necessarily, for any piece
of evidence supplied to S by their sensory experience, Ep, Ep is a fact S is in a
position to know even in deception scenarios.
PriorityP Necessarily, for any proposition known by S via perception, p, and for any
deception scenario in which S is deceived concerning p, prior to S knowing that
p via perception S is in a position to know that that scenario does not obtain.2
The Deception Sceptic will then complete the second step of their argument in the
following way. First, they will argue for the restriction of our sensory evidence to little
more than truths about the way things appear (Phenomenal EvidenceP ). Second, they
will insist that we must be in a position to know that we are not in the deception scenario
prior to knowing anything via sensory experience (PriorityP ). And then finally they will
argue that one can know that one is not in the deception scenario either by inference
from one’s perceptual knowledge or via one’s phenomenal perceptual evidence directly.
PriorityP precludes the former. The latter is precluded by UnderdeterminationK . If
sound, this argument would render all knowledge via perception impossible.3
To a first approximation, that is how the Deception Sceptic’s argument works. What
about the Debasing Sceptic’s argument? Let’s start with the first step of the argument:
the establishment of the possibility of the debasing scenario. The debasing scenario can
be thought of in the following way. We are all used to cases of beliefs held in an ill-
formedmanner. Beliefs held out of prejudice, wishful thinking, oﬀ the back of fallacious
reasoning, and oﬀ the back of a defective consideration of the available evidence, are
all examples of routes to this epistemically undesirable status. The debasing scenario
is one in which the daemon has arranged it so that the agent’s beliefs are held in an ill-
formed manner, but they cannot distinguish this epistemically defective situation from
a situation in which their beliefs are all well-formed, that is (what I shall assume here is
an identical status): held in the light of adequate epistemic reasons. Perhaps the daemon
does this by making our beliefs held out of wishful thinking, and then making it the case
that we are self-deceived about this. Or perhaps the daemon turns the screw by making
us fail to consider some salient piece of evidence, and then making it seem to us as if
our consideration of the evidence has been maximally judicious. However the result
is achieved, the agent’s beliefs are debased even though it seems to them just like they
2For a sympathetic treatment of such Priority principles see, for example, Wright (2002, 2004, 2007) and
Davies (1998, 2000, 2003).
3As one of my reviewers points out, there are alternative ways of formulating the second step of the
Deception Sceptic’s reasoning, some of which may not rely on all three of the principles broached. It’s
a good question, but one which falls out of the scope of this paper, whether the Deception Sceptic ought
to prefer one of these alternative formulations.
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aren’t. This result can be achieved, it will be noted, without the daemon making any of
our beliefs false, as in the deception scenario; an ill-formed belief which seems well-
formed need not thereby count as a false belief. Moreover, the result can be achieved
consistently with the agent continuing to possess decisive reason to hold the relevant
belief; an ill-formed belief which seems well-formed need not thereby count as lacking
(propositional) justification. Such a scenario seems possible. I will be defending its
possibility in §2.
How shouldwe construe the second step of theDebasing Sceptic’s argument? Schaf-
fer’s commentators agree that we should construe the second step as relying on the claim
that it is not possible for one to know that one is not in the debasing scenario. Beyond
that, there is disagreement on how the second step might proceed. I will be oﬀering my
own interpretation of the second step in §3.
Debasing Scepticism is interesting because the danger the debasing scenario poses
to our would-be knowledge seems to be wider in scope than that posed by the deception
scenario. Whereas there seem to be some truths about which we cannot be deceived –
I am currently thinking, say – it seems that every proposition could be believed in an
ill-formed manner. Thus, the debasing daemon “threatens universal doubt, in the sense
of threatening knowledge of any proposition p” (Schaﬀer, 2010: 232).
2 The First Step Defended
Bondy and Carter (Forthcoming) aim to provide us with two reasons for thinking that the
debasing scenario is not possible. The first is that the possibility of the scenario is ruled
out by all extant accounts of the basing relation. The second is that the possibility of
the scenario is ruled out by a plausible conception of the relation between basing one’s
belief on reasons and the activity of justifying one’s belief, defended by Leite (2004). I
tackle the former in §2.1 and the latter in §2.2.
2.1 The Debasing Scenario and the Nature of the Basing Relation
Bondy and Carter argue that the possibility of the debasing scenario requires there to
be a possible world at which:
. . . [(i)] a demon causes some subject S to believe p on the basis of a bad
reason R1 at time t. And (ii) at a later time t2 the demon makes S think that
his reason for believing p was a diﬀerent good reason R2. And (iii) at t2 it
remains the case that S holds his belief only on the basis of R1, and not on
the basis of R2. (Bondy and Carter, Forthcoming: 8-9)
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They then argue that on either the causal theory4 or the doxastic theory5 of the basing
relation, it is not possible for (i)-(iii) to hold together. Since any theory of the basing
relation will be committed to some version of one of these theories (at least prima facie),
we get the result that the debasing scenario is not possible (at least prima facie).
Let us start with the Causal Theory. According to a simple version of the Causal
Theory, S’s belief that p is based on the reason that q if, and only if, S’s belief that
p is causally sustained by S’s belief that q.6 This theory immediately runs into the
well-known problem of deviant causal chains. Following a plausible suggestion made
by Turri (2011: 393), however, Bondy and Carter argue that deviant cases need to be
handled by supplementing the simple Causal Theory in the following manner. What the
proponent of it should say is that S’s belief that p is based on the reason that q if, and
only if, S’s belief that p is causally sustained by S’s belief that q and the synchronic
process of causation linking S’s belief that q with S’s belief that p is – the whole thing –
the manifestation of a disposition the agent has which constitutes one of their cognitive
traits.
Bondy and Carter argue, however, that once Turri’s modification is made, conditions
(i)-(iii) cannot all be met together, so that the debasing scenario is not possible. Their
thought here is that since the daemon is ensuring that S’s belief is causally sustained by
their belief in (the bad reason) R1, their belief being sustained by R1 does not manifest
one of the agent’s own cognitive traits, and thus, by the lights of the modified causal
theory, S’s belief isn’t really based on R1 after all.7
The problem with this argument is that the debasing scenario needn’t be construed
as a scenario in which the daemon makes it the case that the agent holds a belief on
the basis of any reason at all: it needn’t be construed as a scenario in which Bondy and
Carter’s conditions (i) and (iii) are met. All that matters for the debasing scenario is
that it seems to the agent as if their belief is well-formed, and hence held on the basis
of a decisive reason, but that that is not really so. How the daemon ensures this is left
open: it could be by making their belief that p based on some alternative reason which
isn’t really an adequate one (a bad reason, in other words), and this might indeed be
precluded by the modified Causal Theory. But the daemon could equally ensure the ill-
formedness of the agent’s belief in myriad other ways, for example by making the belief
sustained by some prejudice, or wishful thinking. In that case, the agent’s belief would
4For variants of the causal theory see, for example, Harman (1970), Audi (1983), Moser (1989), McCain
(2012) and Turri (2011).
5For variants of the doxastic theory see, for example, Tolliver (1982), Ginet (1985), Audi (1986), Korcz
(2000) and, seemingly, Lehrer (1971).
6To keep things simple I ignore here the prior cause version of the Causal Theory which Bondy and
Carter (Forthcoming: 10) also discuss. This makes no dialectical diﬀerence.
7See Bondy and Carter (ibid.)
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not count as being based on any reason at all.
Indeed, the problem for Bondy and Carter is worse than this, for they have in fact
supplied us with yet another way in which the daemon might operate, other than by
causing the agent to believe on the basis of a bad reason: the daemon might operate by
ensuring that S’s belief is causally sustained in away that doesn’t manifest their cognitive
traits, even though it seems to them as if it does. So the modified Causal Theory does
not preclude the possibility of the debasing scenario; if anything, it strengthens the case
for its possibility.
Next, what about the Doxastic Theory? According to the Doxastic Theory, S holds
their belief that p in the light of the reason that q if, and only if, S also believes that
q is a decisive reason to believe that p. Call the claim read from right-to-left Doxastic
(Suﬃcient) and call the claim read from left-to-right Doxastic (Necessary). Here is how
Bondy and Carter argue that Doxastic (Suﬃcient) would preclude the possibility of the
debasing scenario:
. . . it’s explicitly included in the description of the debasing daemon scen-
ario that at t2, S comes to think that he holds his belief that p on the basis of
the good reason R2. So S thinks that R2 is a good reason for believing that
p at t2. So according to Doxastic (Suﬃcient) S believes p on the basis of R2
at t2. (Bondy and Carter, Forthcoming: 9)
And yet, the agent is precisely not supposed to hold their belief that p on the basis
of R2 at t2.
In reply, it seems to me that any plausible version of Doxastic (Suﬃcient) will have
to include a ceteris paribus clause which isn’t met in the debasing scenario. To see why,
consider cases of prejudiced belief, and belief sustained by mere wishful thinking. It’s
plausible on the face of it that these cases are cases of ill-formed belief; that seems to
be the most natural way to explain why agents in such cases lack justified beliefs, after
all. But such epistemic maladies can be, and often are, accompanied by a disposition
to defend the belief in question by appeal to some consideration the agent believes to
be a decisive reason to hold the relevant belief. In particular, agents in such cases can
be, and often are, in the grip of a kind of self-deception about why they hold the belief
in question: they convince themselves that the belief in question is held in a healthy,
rational manner, even though it isn’t. And as a result there is some consideration avail-
able to them which, through the relevant mechanism of self-deception, they believe to
be a decisive reason to hold the belief in question. But plausibly, they do not base their
belief on any such consideration nevertheless.
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To handle the possibility of such cases, the proponent of Doxastic (Suﬃcient) should
build a ceteris paribus clause into their principle, and say that that clause is not met
in cases in which the agent suﬀers from the kind of self-deception at issue. But with
this clause added, there is now no reason why the proponent of the possibility of the
debasing scenario cannot simply say that the clause is not met in the debasing scenario,
so that although the agent in that scenario treats R2 as a decisive reason to believe that
p, and might even believe of it that it is, they do not hold their belief on the basis of R2
nevertheless.8
Here finally is how Bondy and Carter argue that Doxastic (Necessary) would pre-
clude the possibility of the debasing scenario:
. . . in the debasing scenario, S does not think at t2 that R1 is a good reason
for p. So according to Doxastic (Necessary), at t2, S does not believe p on
the basis of R1. (Bondy and Carter, Forthcoming: 9)
And yet, the agent is precisely supposed to believe that p on the basis of R1 at t2.
In reply to this, the defender of the possibility of the debasing scenario can point
out once again that the scenario needn’t be construed as one in which the agent believes
on the basis of some bad reason, for it needn’t be conceived as a scenario in which the
agent believes on the basis of any reason at all.
We can conclude, then, that neither the Causal Theory nor the Doxastic Theory poses
a problem for the possibility of the debasing scenario. Let us now turn to Bondy and
Carter’s second reason for doubting the possibility of that scenario.
2.2 The Debasing Scenario and the Justificationaist Conception
We might be asked, by an interlocutor or by ourselves in a moment of reflection, Why
do you/I believe that p? Responding successfully to this question requires engaging in
an activity of justifying one’s belief. We can think of this as a certain kind of conscious
mental activity: an activity which involves bringing to mind some consideration, q, to
the truth of which one is committed,9 which is supposed to settle the matter in favour
of believing that p. Such activity, when carried out to completion, culminates in a con-
scious act of inference q, so p.10 The activity may or may not be linguistically manifest.
8Korcz (2000) appears to make explicit that Doxastic (Suﬃcient), a thesis for which he sets out to provide
arguments, includes a ceteris paribus clause (Ibid.: 527).
9I am simplifying here. In the normal situation there will be myriad considerations.
10Notice that the acts of inference I have in mind here are not pieces of suppositional reasoning. My focus
throughout is on acts of inference which constitutively involve a belief and judgement in what figures
as a premise in the inference.
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What is the relationship between the act of justifying and the state of basing one’s
belief on the relevant reason? Following Leite (2004), Bondy and Carter helpfully dis-
tinguish between two conceptions of the relationship: the Spectatorial Conception and
the Justificationist Conception. According to the former, the act of justifying and the
state of basing are constitutively independent of one another: it is possible to hold the
agent’s state of believing that p in the light of q fixed, whilst varying how the agent is
disposed to reason about whether p, and vice-versa. According to the Justificationist
Conception, by contrast, the act of justifying and the state of basing are constitutively
dependent on one another in at least one direction, if not in both. That is, the Justifica-
tionist subscribes to at least one of the following theses:
(JCN ) Necessarily: if S believes that p in the light of reason q, then S is disposed (and
hence is able) to engage in the activity of consciously reasoning from q to p.
(JCS) Necessarily: if S engages in the activity of consciously reasoning from q to p,
then S believes that p in the light of the reason q.
(JCN ) says that basing one’s belief on a certain reason necessarily comes along with
a disposition to reason from the reason in question, to the belief (and hence an ability
to do so). (JCS) says that the inferences one carries out with respect to p determines the
basis on which one believes that p. If one infers p from q, this suﬃces for one to base
one’s belief on q.
Bondy and Carter argue that each of (JCN ) and (JCS) are plausible, and each rules
out the possibility of the debasing scenario. I now want to argue that the Debasing
Sceptic can perfectly well accept the truth of (JCN ) and (JCS). Indeed, in §3 I will
be supplying my own argument for the prima facie plausibility of the Justificationist
Conception, and I will be suggesting that the Debasing Sceptic utilise that conception
in the second step of their argument. The overall upshot will thus be that, far from the
Justificationist Conception undermining Debasing Scepticism by undermining the first
step of the argument, it positively enables it by enabling the second step.
Take (JCN ) first. Here is how Bondy and Carter argue that it rules out the possibility
of the debasing scenario:
[(JCN )] closes oﬀ the possibility of the debasing demon scenario, because
it entails that. . .S doesn’t believe on the basis of the bad reason R1. (Bondy
and Carter, Forthcoming: 14)
The thought here is this: in the debasing scenario, the agent is not disposed to reason
their way from the bad reason, R1, to p. (JCN ) therefore implies that they don’t believe
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on basis of R1 after all. And yet it is supposed to be built into the debasing scenario that
the agent does believe on the basis of the bad reason R1.
The reader might well already have predicted what my response to this will be: as we
have already seen, the debasing scenario need not be construed as a scenario in which
the agent believes that p on the basis of any reason at all, let alone a bad reason. (JCN )
is thus perfectly compatible with the possibility of such a scenario.
Here now is how Bondy and Carter argue that (JCS) rules out the possibility of the
debasing scenario:
[(JCS)] also rules out the debasing demon, because it entails that at t2, S
believes that p on the basis of the good reason R2. (Bondy and Carter,
Forthcoming: 14)
The thought here is that the antecedent of (JCS) is met at t2, so that the agent would
count as believing that p on the basis of the good reason R2, at t2, after all.
An initial problem for this reasoning is that the debasing deamonmight make it seem
to the agent, at t2, that they believe that p on the basis of R2, but the agent needn’t have
inferred p from R2 at t2 nevertheless. If that’s so, however, then at t2, the antecedent of
(JCS) needn’t be met. However, we can tweak Bondy and Carter’s reasoning here in the
following way, so that their inference from (JCS) to the impossibility of the debasing
scenario is more defensible. In the debasing scenario, it seems to the agent as if they
believe that p on the basis of some good reason, R2, and hence they are disposed to
justify their belief via a course of reasoning which culminates in the drawing of the
inference R2, so p. Let us suppose that that disposition is triggered, so that they make
that inference. Then given (JCS) that would suﬃce for them to believe that p on the basis
of R2. But the proponent of the scenario intends it precisely not be the case that even
were the disposition triggered, the agent would count as believing that p on the basis of
R2.
My response to this takes as its starting point some reflections on the following well-
discussed case from Peacocke (1998):
Someone canmake a judgement, and for good reasons, but it not have the ef-
fects that judgements normally do – in particular, it may not result in a stored
belief that has the proper influence on other judgements and on action. A
Combination of prejudice and self-deception, amongst many other possibil-
ities, can produce this state of aﬀairs. Someone may judge that undergradu-
ate degrees from countries other than her own are of an equal standard to
her own, and excellent reasons might be operative in her assertions to that
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eﬀect. All the same, it might be quite clear, in decisions she makes on hir-
ing, or in making recommendations, that she does not really have this belief
at all. (Peacocke, 1998: 90)
Peacocke’s agent is disposed to reason her way from decisive evidence for thinking
that foreign degrees are of the same quality as home degrees, treated as such by her, to
the conclusion that foreign degrees have that status. And yet her behaviour manifests
the belief that such degrees are not equal. Peacocke’s case constitutes a prima facie
counterexample to (JCS), for suppose Peacocke’s agent engages in their act of reasoning.
Then by the lights of (JCS), it would follow that she believes that foreign degrees are on-
par with home degrees on the basis of the relevant evidence. But that is precisely not so,
simply because it’s at least initially plausible that the agent in Peacocke’s case doesn’t
so much as believe what they judge, as Peacocke himself suggests. To see why this has
initial plausibility, suppose that Peacocke’s agent does believe that foreign degrees are of
the same quality as home degrees. In that case, we’d have to say that the agent possesses
a belief which is systematically precluded from having eﬀects on the their behaviour;
it’s written into the case, after all, that the agent’s behaviour manifests a belief in the
opposite. But if that’s so, the theoretically simpler thing to say is that the agent fails to
have the belief in question.
If (JCS) is to have any plausibility, then, the proponent of it will have to say some-
thing about Peacocke’s case. I now want to argue that the proponent of (JCS) should
accept a certain pluralist conception of apparent acts of inference in order to defend their
view against the objection generated by Peacocke’s case. I will argue further, however,
that once (JCS) is conceived as requiring such a commitment, it no longer threatens the
possibility of the debasing scenario.
The pluralist conception of apparent acts of inference I have in mind says the fol-
lowing. On the one hand, there are conscious mental acts of inference from q to p, the
completion of which necessitates the agent believing that p for the reason that q. On
the other hand, there are conscious mental occurrences during which it seems to the
agent as if they are drawing an inference from q to p, but they are not because the oc-
currence in question has no impact on whether they believe that p, nor for what reason
they believe that p (if they believe that p at all). The two conscious mental occurrences
are diﬀerent in kind, for the former has an essential property – it’s necessitating that the
agent believes that p for the reason that q – which the latter doesn’t. But occurrences of
the second kind are introspectively indistinguishable from occurrences of the first kind.
To be clear, the suggestion is that the occurrence of a merely apparent inference
does not have an impact on whether the agent believes that p, nor for for what reason.
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Consistently with such an event occurring in the agent’s mental life, the agent might
already have the belief that p anyway, in which case the apparent inference has no impact
on the prior basis of that belief, if any. But equally consistently with such an event
occurring in the agent’s mental life, the agent might not already have the belief that p.
In that case the merely apparent inference has no power to generate the belief that p.
The further thought is that we can contrast merely apparent inferences, conceived in the
way just broached, with bone fide inferences, the engagement in which suﬃces for one
to believe that p on the basis of the relevant consideration(s).
Assuming that (JCS) is well motivated, it need not be ad hoc for the proponent of
(JCS) to subscribe to this pluralistic conception of apparent inferences. Pre-philosophically,
we acknowledge that there is some important diﬀerence between the purported act of
justifying carried out by Peacocke’s agent and normal acts of justifying. We would
want to acknowledge that there is a sense in which the former, but not the latter, fail to
manifest the agent’s genuine assessment of the situation; in purportedly justifying their
belief there is a sense in which the agent is paying mere lip service to the evidence. The
proponent of (JCS) would be within their rights to say that the question of how to cash
out this diﬀerence, which we should all acknowledge, is a matter to be decided by an
independently motivated theory of the relationship between basing and justifying.
With this pluralism about acts of apparent inference in tow, the proponent of (JCS)
can readily handle Peacocke’s case: they can just say that Peacocke’s agent is engaged in
a merely apparent inference, but that (JCS) is a suﬃciency thesis concerning only bona
fide inferences. Moreover, with (JCS) now conceived as committed to this pluralism
about acts of apparent inference, Bondy and Carter’s argument from the truth of (JCS)
to the impossibility of the debasing scenario is also rendered unsound. For, it will be
recalled, that argument appeals to the idea that the agent in the debasing scenario would
reason from some adequate epistemic reason, to the conclusion that p even though the
daemon is supposed to make it so that they don’t believe that p for that adequate epi-
stemic reason. However, the proponent of the possibility of the scenario can now simply
respond by saying that in the debasing scenario, the daemon makes it the case that with
respect to their belief that p, the agent is in a situation analogous to Peacocke’s agent:
they are made to have the disposition to engage in merely apparent inferences from suf-
ficient reasons to the conclusion that p.
To be sure, the proponent of the possibility of the debasing scenario would acknow-
ledge that there is a disanalogy between the agent in Peacocke’s scenario, and the agent
in the debasing scenario: the former does not so much as believe that p, whereas the lat-
ter certainly does. But as pointed out above, this is perfectly consistent with the thought
that the agents in each case only have available to them a merely apparent act of infer-
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ence.
We can conclude, then, that Bondy and Carter do not succeed in establishing that
the Justificationist Conception rules out the possibility of the Debasing Scenario. The
first step of the Debasing Sceptic’s argument should be granted.
3 The Second Step Re-Conceived
Let us now turn our attention to the second step of the Debasing Sceptic’s argument. I
am going to suggest that there is a prima facie plausible framework for conceiving of the
agent’s power to hold their belief in the light of reasons the correctness of which enables
us to provide a fresh construal of the argument’s second step. §3.1 states the framework
and provides it with prima facie justification. §3.2 provides the fresh construal of the
argument’s second step. §3.3 responds to the objection that the argument, so conceived,
cannot be extended to perceptual knowledge.
3.1 A Framework
The framework for thinking about the agent’s power to hold their beliefs for reasons is
composed of three doctrines: (i) the Justificationist Conception described in §2.2; (ii)
the claim that the inferences a capacity for which is said to be required for believing for
a reason by the Justificationist Conception are basic mental actions; and (iii) a certain
epistemic thesis concerning basic actions. Let us take each claim in turn.
I have already explained what the Justificationist Conception amounts to. Why think
it plausible? Take (JCN ) first and consider an agent who believes that p in the light of
the reason that q. It’s prima facie plausible that the ‘in the light of’ relation which is
instantiated by the agent’s belief is a kind of relation which can be instantiated at all
only if the agent can be held responsible for their belief in a certain sort of way. On the
face of it, part of what it is to believe that p in the light of q is to open oneself up to
praise and criticism, in so far as one holds the belief that p, at least partly on the basis
of whether one’s reason is adequate.
It’s also prima facie plausible that an agent can be held responsible for their belief
that p only if the agent is able to exercise control of what they think about whether p. So:
believing that p in the light of the reason that q requires the agent to be able to exercise
such control. But it’s prima facie plausible in turn that this activity just is the activity
of consciously reasoning from a set of considerations which one treats as reasons, to a
conclusion about whether p: the activity of justifying one’s belief. So we get the further
result that believing in the light of a reason requires the ability to consciously reason
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from the set of reasons one has at one’s disposal, to a conclusion about whether p.
However, presumably one’s holding the belief that p in the light of q in particular
will have an eﬀect on the reasoning one is guaranteed to be able to carry out whenever
one believes that p in the light of q: one will be disposed, during the course of that
reasoning, to infer: q, so p. That gets us to (JCN ).
What now about (JCS)? Suppose one engages in an activity of justifying one’s be-
lief that p by appeal to the reason that q. It’s prima facie plausible that this very activity
constitutively involves the kind of responsibility-involving status already broached. It’s
prima facie plausible, that is, that if one justifies one’s belief that p in a way that cul-
minates in the inference q, so p, then one has opened oneself up to praise and criticism,
in so far as one judges that p, at least partly on the basis of whether q really is an ad-
equate reason to judge that p. This is part of what it is to engage in the act of justifying.
Thus, there’s a kind of normative status which partly constitutes the act of justifying that
mirrors the normative status that partly constitutes holding one’s belief in the light of a
reason.
How are we to explain this correlation? The simplest way to explain it is by saying
that when one infers p from q, part of what it is to do so is to be in the state of believing
that p in the light of the reason that q: conscious inferences are, constitutively, the con-
scious manifestation of standing states of believing in the light of reasons. That way, it’s
no wonder that inference constitutively involves the same type of normative condition
as believing in the light of a reason. Any alternate explanation is bound to introduce a
greater degree of complexity than this one. But notice that the explanation in question
commits us to (JCS).
So the Justificationist Conception has prima facie plausibility. The second doctrine
which forms our framework is the claim that those inferences a capacity for which is
said to be required for believing for a reason by (JCN ) are basic mental actions. There
are really two ideas here: (a) that such inferences are actions and (b) that they are basic
actions. A case in favour of (a) can be made straightforwardly. I’ve already said that
believing that p in the light of the reason that q requires that one can be held responsible
for one’s believing that p; that one can be responsible for one’s -ing only if one is able
to control for whether one s; and that in the case of belief this control is exercised
in inferences from one’s reasons to a conclusion about whether p. These claims were
all part of the argument for (JCN ). But it’s prima facie plausible that the events which
constitute our taking control of something such that we can be held responsible for it
are actions: the kind of control required for responsibility is agential.11
But it is also plausible that if drawing the inference q, so p is an action at all, then it is
11None of which is to say, of course, that inferences are voluntarily actions.
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a basic action (under that description).12 To a first approximation, something is a basic
action just in case it is something which one can just do, without one’s doing it by doing
something else which is a means of doing it.13 Simple examples of basic bodily actions
include arm raisings (but not attracting the teacher’s attention), moving one’s finger in a
downward motion against the switch (though not boiling the kettle), and moving one’s
cue arm (though not potting the blue). Some examples of basic mental actions include
calculating the answer to a certain arithmetical question (though not solving the problem
which the question constitutes), looking at the letters on the optician’s eye chart (though
not completing the long-sightedness test), and imagining what would happen were one
to try jumping the gorge (though not making oneself feel nervous). Right oﬀ the bat,
it seems plausible that drawing the inference q, so p is yet another basic mental action.
What else would one need to do as a way of performing an inference, after all?
This brings us to the final element of the framework: the epistemic claim that for
any action basic under a certain description, it is at least metaphysically possible for
one who is capable of acting in that way to know that they are acting in that way, or
have acted in that way, under that description. This claim, insisting as it does only on
a mere metaphysical possibility, is modally weak. It eﬀectively says that in order for a
certain occurrence in an agent’s life to count as an action they engage in, we must be
able to find it intelligible – there must be some possibility – of their standing in a certain
epistemic relation to it. The claim is prima facie plausible. Actions are occurrences
in the agent’s life the initiation or continuance of which is an exercise of control on
the agent’s part. It is diﬃcult to make sense of what it is for an agent to exercise such
control unless we credit the agent, in -ing, with a capacity to know what they are doing
(relative to a description of their -ing as basic). But, I submit, S knows what they are
doing in -ing, relative to a description of their -ing as basic, only if it is at the very
least metaphysically possible for them to know that they are -ing, or have just ed,
under the relevant description.
3.2 Completing the Second Step
With the framework just provided with prima facie justification in tow, we are now in a
position to see how the Debasing Sceptic might utilise it in filling-in the details of the
second step of their argument.
I want to begin this stage of the discussion with a reminder. Amongst the claims
for which I argued in §2 is that the proponent of (JCS) should accept a pluralist view
12From hereon I will often bracket the caveat that actions are basic only relative to descriptions.
13Compare O’Brien (2007: 163-164)
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of apparent inferences according to which apparent inference are either bona fide infer-
ences, which determine what the agent believes and for what reason, or merely apparent
inferences, which do not. Since (JCS) is part of the framework defended in §3.1, this
pluralism should indeed be thought of as an element of the debasing sceptic’s position.
I also argued that if (JCS) is true, the proponent of the possibility of the debasing scen-
ario should go ahead and claim that the agent in the debasing scenario only has an act
of merely apparent inference available to them. Since (JCS) is part of the framework
defended in §3.2, this is indeed a further element of the Debasing Sceptic’s position.
The Debasing Sceptic is thus committed to saying that I have just inferred p from q,
where this is the thought had by an agent who takes themselves to be in the ordinary
case and where it seems to them as if they have just inferred p from q, entails I am not
in the debasing scenario.
From here the Debasing Sceptic can complete the second stage of their argument
by first demonstrating that it is not possible for one to know that one has just inferred p
from q, and second inferring from this that knowledge in general is not possible.
The first move relies on the following analogues of the Deception Sceptic’s Phenom-
enal EvidenceP and PriorityP principles:
Phenomenal EvidenceB (i) Necessarily, for any proposition known by S of the form I
have just inferred p from q, S knows that proposition only because S believes it
on the basis of evidence supplied to them by their act of apparent inference from
q to p; and (ii) Necessarily, for any piece of evidence supplied to S by their act
of apparent inference, Ei, Ei is a fact S is in a position to know even in debasing
scenarios.
PriorityB Necessarily, for any proposition known by S of the form I have just inferred
p from q, prior to S knowing that proposition S is in a position to know that they
are not in the debasing scenario.
Suppose an agent in the ordinary scenario engages in an inference from q to p. How
would they know that they have just done so? Relying on Phenomenal EvidenceB the
Debasing Sceptic will say that they know this at all only by appeal to evidence, and
that evidence is restricted to what can be known even in the debasing scenario. Since
(JCS) implies that one cannot engage in the act of inference from q to p in the debasing
scenario, the Debasing Sceptic will say that the relevant evidence is restricted merely
to claims of the form it appears to me as if I have just inferred p from q, instead of the
stronger I have just inferred p from q.
Next, the Debasing Sceptic posits PriorityB, an analogue of the Deception Sceptic’s
PriorityP , and therefore presumably a thesis which has as much to be said for it as the
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latter. At this point, the Debasing Sceptic can argue that one can know that one is not
in the debasing scenario only if either one is in a position to know it via inference from
the claim that one has just inferred p from q, or by appeal to the phenomenal evidence
provided by one’s act of inference directly. The former is straightforwardly precluded by
PriorityB. The latter is precluded by UnderdeterminationK , for the evidence it appears
to me as if I have just inferred p from q underdetermines whether one is in the debasing
scenario. Thus, they can conclude that one is not in a position to know that one is not
in the debasing scenario. And since, by PriorityB, one would need to be in a position to
know that if one is to be in a position to know that one has just inferred p from q in the
first place, it is not possible for one to know that one has just inferred p from q either.
This completes the first move of the second stage of the Deception Sceptic’s argu-
ment. It relies only on (JCS), and the same style of reasoning relied on by the Deception
Sceptic in the second stage of their argument. What now of the second move, which
completes the argument for the sceptical conclusion?
It has already been argued that it must be possible for one to know that one has
performed an action under a certain description of it as basic if the relevant occurrence
is to count as an action in the first place, and that the episodes of inference a capacity
for which is required for believing for reasons by (JCS) are basic actions. The Debasing
Sceptic has just argued that we cannot know that we have engaged in an inference from q
to p. So they can conclude that such events in our mental lives do not constitute actions.
The impossibility of our knowing our inferences robs us of the ability to engage in
actions of inference.
However, since having a capacity to engage in actions of inference is laid down as
necessary for basing one’s belief on reasons by (JCN ), it follows from our being unable
to perform such actions that we cannot believe that p in the light of the reason that q.
Since this argument can be run for any belief, no matter what the value of p, we get the
result that it is not possible for any belief of ours to be held in the light of epistemic
reasons. Our being incapacitated with respect to acts of inference in turn precludes us
from holding beliefs in the light of reasons. Well-founded belief is impossible.
Finally, since well-founded beliefs are necessary for knowledge, we get the sceptical
conclusion that it is not possible for us to know anything. Relying on the remaining
elements of our framework, the Deception Sceptic reaches their extreme conclusion.
3.3 The Perceptual Case
It might be thought that the case of perceptual warrant generates problems for the Debas-
ing Sceptic’s argument. That’s because it might be thought that in the perceptual case,
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one’s belief is held in the light of reasons supplied to one by one’s perceptual experi-
ence. This, it might be thought in turn, implies that the act of justifying one’s perceptual
belief one is in a position to engage in cannot be conceived as an inference from one’s
reason, to the proposition believed: there is no inferential transition from experience to
belief.
It will be concluded that (JCN ) at best only covers those range of cases where one’s
belief is sustained not by a perceptual experience, but by some other belief(s) one has.
Given that, the argument presented in §3.2 can only hope to achieve a limited sceptical
result concerning knowledge one has by dint of other articles of knowledge one pos-
sesses. It leaves perceptual knowledge, and perhaps non-inferential sources of know-
ledge in general, untouched. Since Debasing Scepticism is supposed to be significant
partly because it has knowledge of every kind in its scope, if this line of thought is right
then Debasing Scepticism would lose much of its significance.
There are a number of ways of responding to this worry. One is simply to point out
that just because perceptually warranted beliefs are beliefs rationalised by experiences
themselves, it does not follow that the act of justifying is not an inference. Perhaps
my visual experience of the red ball itself stands in a rationalising relation to my belief
that there is a red ball there, so that the latter counts as being held in the light of a
reason supplied by the former. And perhaps the two states standing in that relation to
one another requires that I have the ability to justify the latter by appeal to the reason
supplied by the former. Still, it doesn’t follow that the act of justifying in question is non-
inferential. It could be that the act of justifying constitutively involves the manifestation
of (perhaps freshly acquired) beliefs I have in propositions that either are, or represent,
my perceptual reasons, from which I then infer the truth of my perceptual belief. Thus,
perceptual warrant might be thought to be no counter-example to (JCN ) after all.
But suppose that picture is not right. Suppose, that is, that we can find compelling
grounds for thinking that the act of justifying one is able to engage in when one believes
in the light of perceptual reasons must involve a transition from one’s perceptual reason
qua reason one possesses because of one’s perceptual experience. In that case, the act of
justifying cannot be conceived as a transition from one judgement (the content of which
is the proposition which either is or represents one’s reason), to another (the content of
which is the proposition believed). Rather it must be conceived as a transition from one’s
experiential state itself to a judgement the content of which is the proposition believed.
Still, there would be a reply to the current worry available anyway. The thought
would be that to the extent that we have good reason to think that the act of justifying in
the perceptual case is non-inferential, that will just mean that we have to acknowledge
the possibility of acts of justifying that are inextricably perceptual in nature. Call those
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acts perceptual-rational transitions. In order to acknowledge the possibility of such
acts, we would have to reformulate (JCN ) in the following way:
(JCN*) Necessarily: if S believes that p in the light of reason q, then S is disposed (and
hence is able) to engage in the activity of consciously justifying their belief that
p by appeal to q.
It would then be left open whether the relevant act of justifying takes on the form
of inference, or of a perceptual-rational transition, depending on whether it is a case of
perceptual warrant.
Next, the framwork presented in §3.1 swould have to be reformulated in the fol-
lowing manner. We would have to say that when S engages in a perceptual-rational
transition, that is a basic kind of mental action and is hence something that the agent
can in principle know that they are doing, or have just done. And we would have to
say that such actions can be performed only if the agent ends up counting as holding a
belief that p in the light of a perceptual reason, so that in the debasing scenario it merely
seems to the agent as if they engage in such an activity. The argument presented in §3.2
could then proceed in much the same way for perceptual belief as it does for belief held
on the basis of other belief.
4 The Viability of Debasing Scepticism
I have defended the first step of the Debasing Sceptic’s argument against Bondy and
Carter’s objections, and have put on the map a fresh way of construing the argument’s
second step. In this final section, I want to defend the argument, so conceived, against
objections from Schaﬀer’s remaining critics: Brueckner (2011), Ballantyne and Evans
(2013), and Conee (2015). I will also consider a fresh objection suggested to me by one
of my reviewers. I do not, of course, want to demonstrate that the argument, as it has
been interpreted here, is sound. I am no sceptic. Indeed, for all I have said there might be
a successful reply to Deception Scepticism currently on the market which can be made
to work just as well against Debasing Scepticism. Rather, my aim is just to defend the
claim that there is an interestingly plausible form of scepticism here by showing that the
argument cannot be dismissed on the grounds oﬀered by Schaﬀer’s remaining critics.
Let me take each in turn.
Brueckner. Apparently following Schaﬀer (2010: 234) himself, Brueckner (2011:
296-297) reconstructs the second step of the Debasing Sceptic’s argument in the fol-
lowing way. Knowing that p requires that one’s belief that p is properly based. But
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knowing that p also requires being in a position to know that one knows that p. Thus,
an application of (a version of) the Closure Principle gets us: if one knows that p, then
one is in a position to know that one’s belief that p is properly based. But given that
one cannot rule out that one is not in the debasing scenario, one cannot know that one’s
belief that p is properly based, for any proposition p. So: one cannot know that p, for
any proposition p.
Brueckner points out that the second step of the argument so conceived relies on
a version of the KK principle, and plausibly rejects it on the grounds that the relevant
principle is false. However, there is no need to interpret the second step of the argument
in a way that involves an appeal to any version of the KK principle. The reconstruction
of the second step presented in §3.2 does not do so.
Ballantyne and Evans. Ballantyne and Evans (2013: 3-5) argue that the second step
of the Debasing Sceptic’s argument must proceed by an inference from the thought that
the debasing scenario is possible, to the thought that one is not propositionally justified
in believing that p, for any first-order proposition p about the way the world is. They
then provide a further interesting argument for how any such inference is bound to fail.
There is no need to examine the further details of Ballantyne and Evans’s discus-
sion, because it should already be clear how they have gone wrong: there is no need to
construe the second step of the Debasing Sceptic’s argument as relying on an inference
from the possibility of the debasing scenario, to the lack of propositional justification
for belief in the target first-order proposition about the world – the reconstruction of
the second step presented in §3.2 does not do so. Having said that, it does rely on an
inference from UnderdeterminationK and Phenomenal EvidenceB to the claim that one
is not propositionally justified in believing that one is not in the debasing scenario, but
Ballantyne and Evans do not apply their argument to that inference.
Conee. Conee plausibly claims that, however the second stage of the debasing scep-
tic’s argument is to be understood exactly, it will need to appeal at some stage to the
claim that it is not possible for us to know that we are not in the debasing scenario. But,
Conee suggests, we have a range of introspective evidence available to us which enable
us to rule out that we are in the debasing scenario.
One source of introspective data Conee describes as follows:
Often, as we draw a conclusion from evidence that supports its truth, we
have the marked impression that we are relying on the evidence to believe
the conclusion. . .These impressions of reliance and deference, with their
causal implications, are evidence that the reasons from which we infer our
conclusions cause us to believe them. (Conee, 2015: 6)
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In reply to this, the Debasing Sceptic should ask: what are the ‘impressions of reli-
ance and deference’ Conee is talking about other than its seeming to one as if one has just
drawn an inference from one’s evidence, to the proposition believed? But the Debasing
Sceptic will simply suggest in turn that one’s having undergone an apparent inference is
good evidence for believing that one believes on the basis of the relevant evidence only
if, prior to knowing that, one has ruled it out that one is not in the debasing scenario.
A second source of introspective data Conee describes as follows:
We have evidence from memory and perception for the existence of an ex-
tensive range of close correlations between our having justifying evidence
for the beliefs that we apparently know and our forming and sustaining those
beliefs. A few arbitrarily chosen examples: we believe that Jane Austen
wrote Pride and Prejudice when we have recollections supporting that she
wrote the book, we believe that we are sitting when we have sensory ex-
periences giving evidence that we are seated. . . and so forth. (Conee, 2015:
5)
Conee’s idea is that for a great many of our beliefs, and some pieces of evidence in
our possession for those beliefs, we can know the following fact concerning them: when
one consciously takes q to be a suﬃcient reason for believing that p at t, one also comes,
or continues, to believe that p at t or immediately after. Call a proposition which states
one of these correlations a reasons-belief correlation claim. Conee’s argument is that
the knowledge we are in a position to have of a great many reasons-belief correlation
claims licenses an abductive inference to the conclusion that our beliefs are by-and-large
held in the light of reasons in our possession, and this in turn enables us to rule it out
that we are in the debasing scenario.
In reply to this, the Debasing Sceptic should ask: how do we come to know the truth
of a reasons-belief correlation claim? Presumably, the process would take the following
form: first, the agent consciously takes q to be a decisive reason to believe that p, there
is then a rational transition from such conscious taking to a judgement that p, and their
having run through this process puts them in a position to know the truth of a reasons-
belief correlation claim.
Now, leaving aside the complications that will have to be introduced in order to
accommodate the perceptual case explored in §3.3, I take it that this process simply
is the engagement in an apparent inference from q to p. But now we can ask: under
what circumstances would its seeming to the agent as if they have just inferred p from
q ground knowledge in a reasons-belief correlation claim? Presumably, it would do
so only if it could ground knowledge that one has come to believe that p. However,
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given the framework within which I have suggested they operate, the Debasing Sceptic
could say in response to this that in order for running through an apparent inference to
ground knowledge that one has come to believe that p, one will already have to have
warrant for believing that the apparent inference is a genuine inference. And to have
warrant to believe that, one would already need warrant to believe that one is not in the
debasing scenario. Thus, the Debasing Sceptic is within their right to argue that this
second source of introspective data Conee appeals to is not available to us in the first
place.
A Final Challenge. I want to consider a final way of challenging the Debasing Scep-
tic’s argument which has been suggested to me by one of my reviewers. The challenge
has two components. First, there is the thought that Phenomenal EvidenceB is overly
restrictive: included amongst one’s phenomenal evidence should not only be claims of
the form it appears to me as if I have just inferred p from q but also memories of apparent
inferences one has previously engaged in. Second, there is the following question, which
constitutes the challenge to be addressed by theDebasing Sceptic. As long as one doesn’t
have any positive reason to believe that one is in the debasing scenario and also no pos-
itive reason to think that one’s phenomenal evidence is unreliable, why shouldn’t one’s
phenomenal evidence, broadly construed to include memories of apparent inferences,
not be enough to decisively favour belief in the claim that one is not in the debasing
scenario? Surely, if any fallible evidence is ever good enough for all-things-considered
justification, such phenomenal evidence is.
My concern with this way of challenging the Debasing Sceptic’s argument can be
brought out by asking the following question: what is the supposed epistemic relation-
ship between ones phenomenal evidence, understood in the broad manner at issue, and
the claim that one is not in the debasing scenario? On the one hand, we might try to
answer that question by saying this: the phenomenal evidence, broadly construed and
absent the defeaters already described, decisively favours belief in the claim that one
has just inferred p from q, over the claim that one hasn’t. But if that’s the case then it
also decisively favours belief that we are not in the debasing scenario over belief that we
are, because the claim that one has just inferred p from q entails that one is not in the
debasing scenario. The problem with this way of cashing out the relation between one’s
phenomenal evidence, broadly construed, and the claim that one is not in the debasing
scenario, however, is that it falls foul of PriorityB. That’s because on the cashing out at
issue we’re to explain how one is warranted in believing that one is not in the debasing
scenario partly by appeal to the thought that one’s phenomenal evidence warrants one
in believing that one has just inferred p from q, and this presumably violates the require-
ment that one be in a position to know the former prior to one’s being in a position to
21
know the latter.
It seems to me, however, that the only alternative would be to say that the epistemic
relationship between one’s phenomenal evidence, broadly construed, and the claim that
one is not in the debasing scenario is abductive: the best explanation of why it seems to
one as if one has just inferred p from q, and why this also seems to one to be the case a
number of times in the past, is that one is in the normal environment, carrying out bone
fide inferences. But such abductive responses to Scepticism are plagued with problems
which I won’t rehearse here.14
We can conclude then that given our new way of conceiving the Debasing Scep-
tic’s argument, none of Schaﬀer’s remaining commentators succeed in demonstrating
that the argument is unsound, and nor is a certain fresh objection convincing. This suf-
fices to demonstrate that Debasing Scepticism stands as a new and interesting form of
scepticism, not readily dismissible.
It might be suggested, in objection, that all that the current paper achieves is a reduc-
tio on the principles that constitute the framework presented in §3.1. That might well
turn out to be so; whether it does depends on whether it’s decided that wemight be better
oﬀ rejecting one of the Sceptic’s core principles instead, namely: Underdetermination,
Priority, or Phenomenal Evidence. But even if it’s true that the current paper constitutes
a reductio on the framework presented in §3.1, that would still be an interesting result,
given that I have supplied what I hope are plausible-looking arguments for the elements
of that framework.
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